Book Report: “Counterinsurgency in Africa - The Portuguese Way of War (1961-1974)” by John P. Cann

Overview:

Counterinsurgency in Africa - The Portuguese Way of War (1961-1974), written by John P. Cann and published in 1998 by Atena Press, is a vital work that thoroughly examines the military and political strategies Portugal employed during its colonial wars in Africa. These wars, mainly fought in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau, were part of Portugal’s broader effort to maintain control over its colonies during a time when decolonization movements were gaining momentum across Africa and other colonized regions.

Cann, a respected military historian and former U.S. Navy pilot, uses his extensive experience and access to a wide range of primary sources to compile a comprehensive study of counterinsurgency operations. With deep insight into military operations and a keen understanding of the political context, Cann provides a perceptive analysis of how Portugal developed and implemented strategies to counter the insurgencies threatening its colonial rule.

Content Summary:

The book is organized into several sections that explore different aspects of the Portuguese approach to counterinsurgency warfare. Each section is rich in detail and analysis, revealing the complexity of the decisions and military operations conducted by the Portuguese forces.

Historical Context: Cann begins by providing the historical and political backdrop that explains the rise of the colonial wars. He describes how, after World War II, international pressure mounted on colonial powers to grant independence to their colonies. However, Portugal, under the dictatorship of Salazar and later Marcello Caetano, resisted these pressures, viewing its colonies as integral parts of the nation. This perspective was deeply rooted in the ideology of the Estado Novo regime, which saw the empire as essential to Portugal’s identity and prosperity.

Cann explores how independence movements in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau began to gain traction in the 1950s, often with support from foreign powers such as the Soviet Union, China, and some newly independent African countries. He also addresses the social and economic conditions that fueled discontent in the colonies, creating a fertile ground for insurgency.

Portuguese Military Doctrine: The core of the book lies in the analysis of Portuguese military doctrine, which Cann describes as “the Portuguese way of war.” Faced with a guerrilla war, the Portuguese Armed Forces had to adapt to a type of conflict for which they were initially unprepared. Conventional warfare, based on open battles and clear front lines, gave way to irregular warfare, where the enemy was often invisible, blending in with the civilian population.

Cann highlights the importance of special forces units such as the Comandos and Flechas (elite units composed of Africans trained by the Portuguese), which played a crucial role in executing counterinsurgency operations. Additionally, he discusses the extensive use of psychological operations and civic action programs aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the local population or at least neutralizing their support for the insurgents. These programs included economic development initiatives, education, and healthcare projects intended to improve living conditions in conflict areas and reduce the insurgents' base of support.

Case Studies: The case studies presented by Cann are particularly valuable, as they offer detailed insights into the military campaigns in different regions. For example, in Angola, Cann examines Operation Nó Górdio, a large-scale military campaign aimed at breaking the forces of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). In Mozambique, Cann analyzes the struggle against the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), highlighting the challenges faced by the Portuguese army in difficult terrain and with limited support. In Guinea-Bissau, perhaps the most challenging theater of operations, Cann discusses the containment strategies and the difficulties posed by the insurgents' cross-border operations.

Each case study reveals not only the military tactics employed but also the complex interaction between military, political, and societal factors. Cann shows how the war was not merely a series of battles but also a fight for narrative control, where gaining the support of the population was just as crucial as winning on the battlefield.

Comparative Analysis: To put the Portuguese strategies in perspective, Cann conducts a comparative analysis with other counterinsurgency campaigns, such as those of the French in Algeria and the British in Malaya. He points out the similarities and differences in approaches, highlighting how each colonial power adapted its tactics to local conditions and the type of enemy it faced. This comparison helps readers understand why certain tactics worked in some contexts but not in others.

Cann notes that, despite having fewer resources than other colonial powers, the Portuguese managed to sustain the war for over a decade, a testament to the adaptability and determination of the Portuguese Armed Forces. However, he also acknowledges that this adaptation came at a high cost, both in terms of lives lost and the political and social impact on both Portugal and its colonies.

Consequences and Legacy: In the final section, Cann examines the consequences of the colonial wars for both Portugal and its former colonies. He discusses the impact of the war on Portugal itself, including the economic burden, the political shift that culminated in the Carnation Revolution of 1974, and the subsequent process of decolonization.

For the former colonies, Cann addresses the challenges they faced after gaining independence, such as political instability, civil wars, and economic problems, many of which were exacerbated by the legacy of counterinsurgency warfare. Cann reflects on how Portuguese counterinsurgency strategies, while effective in the short term, often left deep scars that negatively affected the post-independence development of these nations.

Critical Analysis:

John P. Cann’s work is exemplary in both its academic rigor and balanced approach. He avoids oversimplification, recognizing the complexities involved in counterinsurgency warfare. At the same time, Cann does not shy away from questioning the morality of certain military practices and reflecting on the long-term consequences of these actions.

One of the most impressive aspects of the book is its ability to integrate detailed military analysis with a deep understanding of the broader political and social contexts. Cann shows how military decisions cannot be understood in isolation but must be seen as part of a larger political strategy aimed not only at defeating the enemy militarily but also at gaining legitimacy in the eyes of the population.

However, despite its comprehensive approach, the book could have benefited from greater inclusion of the perspectives of African insurgents. While Cann focuses primarily on the Portuguese viewpoint, a deeper exploration of the motivations, strategies, and visions of the liberation movements would have provided an even more balanced view of the conflict. Additionally, the use of technical and dense language may pose a challenge for readers without a background in military history or strategy, potentially limiting the book's audience.

Conclusion:

John P. Cann’s Counterinsurgency in Africa - The Portuguese Way of War (1961-1974) is an invaluable contribution to the study of the Portuguese colonial wars and counterinsurgency strategies in general. Through meticulous and detailed analysis, Cann not only documents military operations but also provides a deep understanding of the complex interactions between war, politics, and society. His work reveals how the small and relatively isolated Portuguese state managed to maintain a colonial empire for so long in an increasingly hostile world.

The main lesson that emerges from Cann’s work is the resilience and adaptability of the Portuguese Armed Forces in the face of immense challenges. Despite limited resources and diplomatic isolation, Portugal managed to sustain a prolonged war effort, implementing a counterinsurgency approach that was, in many ways, innovative and effective in the short term. However, Cann also makes it clear that these tactical victories came at a high cost and that, ultimately, the colonial wars contributed to the downfall of the Estado Novo regime and the beginning of a new era both in Portugal and its former colonies.

The book stands as a remarkable example of how military history can offer valuable lessons for the present, particularly in a world where asymmetric conflicts continue to be a dominant feature of contemporary warfare. Cann reminds us that war is as much about military strategy as it is about politics, and that decisions made during conflicts can have consequences far beyond the battlefield.

Ultimately, Counterinsurgency in Africa is not only a detailed account of the Portuguese colonial wars but also a reflection on the nature of war, power, and resistance. For scholars, military professionals, and anyone interested in the history of Portugal and Africa, John P. Cann’s book is an essential read that provides deep insight into the challenges and dilemmas faced by Portugal during one of the most tumultuous periods of its history. This book remains an indispensable reference for anyone seeking to understand not only the history of Portuguese colonial wars but also the complexities inherent in counterinsurgency warfare in any global context.